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Summary : In this paper, we investigate the relationship between private 
and public investment in R&D. Various models proposed in the literature to 
take account for several instruments policies as: (subsidies, taxes…) are 
estimated to verify if private and public R&D spending are complement or 
substitute. 
Our empirical study is based on a dynamic panel model for a sample of (23) 
countries over the period 1992-2004. This research is dealing with the 
relationship between private and public investment in R&D. Results based 
on the GMM method of Arellano and Bond (1991) and the tests of causality 
and unit root applied to the panel data show a positive and significant 
relation between private and public R&D. 
   
Keywords: R&D, Complementarity, Substituability, GMM, Dynamic Panel 
Data.    
JEL Classification: C33, O32, O33 
 
 
 
 
 1
I. Introduction 
The object of this paper is to give the theoretical and empirical arguments which 
allow a satisfactory apprehension of the role that the authorities must play in the fields of 
research and innovation. The activity of R&D represents a significant source of development 
of new knowledge and technological innovation1. The effort towards activity of R&D 
involves with a great importance and this through several resources devoted to the various 
sectors and institutions of research. Expenditure of research and development especially 
constitute a principal source of growth of productivity for innovating countries. Whereas, for 
countries, where the activity of R&D misses almost technological knowledge and innovations 
of which they profit are generally resulting from the importation of equipment and goods of 
intensives investments in technical progress. 
There are less works, the object of which is to study the relation between private and 
public investment in R&D. We propose a model based on the study of this relation through 
several indicators. The principal message to retrain from results of this work is that 
sometimes public investment have been just added to private investment and sometimes have 
just replaced them and tend to exert and effect of crowding out. The governmental policies 
can contribute to growth. For these reasons, a policy of innovation must be designed so that 
the State orders its actions according to a hierarchy of responsibilities. Therefore, it is 
necessary that government must make a favourable environment for innovation and support 
of the companies in incentive to be innovated because the company itself constitutes a 
significant factor of innovation and the resources of the latter are varied such as the R&D or 
the acquisition of technology. 
The policies in favour of the R&D and the innovation changed orientation in the 
industrialized countries since the beginning of the Eighties. The States fiscally supported the 
companies which financed their expenditure of innovation. Several legislative measures to 
support the effort of investment, tax treatment, the expenditure R&D innovation are taken. 
Which roles can be played by authorities in the fields of research and the innovation? In other 
words, how has to act the State in the fields of the R&D to increase the R&D in private 
sector?   
                                                 
1 Grossman and Helpman (1991), Romer (1990). 
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In this work, we will study the existence of a relation of complementarity or 
substitutability in the case of (23)2 countries through an empirical analysis on dynamic panel 
data. This document brings a new lighting on the public/private relation as regards R&D. 
This document will be organized in the following way: In the second section, a brief 
concerning the reason of government aid, i.e. the need for public administrations for 
supporting the R&D. The third section contains an analysis of the interaction between private 
and public R&D in theory and in facts. Evaluation methods are presented in section four. 
Empirical results will be contained in the fifth section. The section number six constitutes the 
conclusion of this work. 
II. Reasons of government help 
Today, we can observe an expansion of policies of innovations in the developed 
countries which devote great investment for R&D. What proves the creation of the climates 
favourable to the level of these countries for the innovation? It is significant that during these 
last years, companies of high technology or advanced technology’s (pharmaceutical, 
aeronautical…) expenditure of research and development increased significantly. The role of 
the governmental policies as regards R&D is not to neglect. Indeed, the policies of innovation 
define specific actions of the State, which must encourage the accumulation of a qualified 
labour on the one hand, and to help the companies to prospect the markets on the other hand. 
This justifies the need for the public administrations for supporting the R&D.   
Thus, which are the reasons of the government aid and the mechanisms the alternate 
ones available to the public administrations to support the R&D? To answer these questions 
we try to analyze the justification of the government aid with the R&D starting from the 
economic theories of growth.  
1. Neo-classic theory of growth  
For Neo-classic theory of growth, technical progress is supposed to be exogenous 
factors. With the balance of long term, population growth and technical progress determine 
the level of the growth rate. This implies, according to the basic assumptions, that the long-
term growth rate is stable, and given in an exogenous way. Within this framework, the impact 
of an action of the authorities is practically ignored.   
                                                 
2 Countries are : Allemagne, Canada, Belgique, Danemark, Espagne, Finlande, Grèce,  Inde, Japon, Norvège, 
Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni, Rep-Tchèque, Italie, France, USA, Chine, Brésil, Australie, Israél, Tunisie, Maroc, 
Egypte.   
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The neo-classic theory of the growth supposes that the economy starts from a weak 
relationship between capital and labour. Just as the marginal returns on capital are decreasing. 
What reduces the encouragement to be invested in the new capital? Thus each new unit of 
capital produces a lower income and less large savings. In the long run, there will be absence 
of incentive to invest. In short, we can say that the assumptions which underlie the neo-
classic theory are not realistic. The technological change is not always an exogenous factor 
outside the market, determined by an unknown process. To the 20th centuries, a good number 
of discoveries and progress were carried out in the commercial sector by companies with 
lucrative goal and not by public administrations or universities where research is directed by 
non-commercial forces. Markets are seldom in perfect competition, moreover, the private 
sector is not capable to produce all the desired goods and services, because some of them are 
goods public and certain others produce external effects.  
2. Endogenous theory growth  
The endogenous theory of growth recommends the relaxation of certain neo-classic 
assumptions and incorporates the failures of the market. However, the economic growth in 
the long run is directed by the accumulation of the factors of production founded this faith on 
knowledge, in particular, human capital, training, R&D and innovation. The endogenous 
models of growth are characterized by a great diversity of the resources selected: The 
investment in physical capital, in human capital, public capital, and labour division, learning 
by doing, research and the technological innovation.   
The endogenous theory of growth recommends that technical progress rises from the 
R&D carried out by companies with lucrative goals. Research and Development constitute a 
significant factor of production process. In short, the assumptions according to which the 
determining factors of long-term growth are endogenous with the decision-making process 
constitute one of the principal exemptions from neo-classic theory of growth and involve 
significant effects on the policy. Indeed, if long-term growth is directed by factors of 
production based on the knowledge which belongs to the normal structure of costs of the 
company, then, by changing the cost of these factors by direct subsidies of tax incentives or 
of marketing policies, the public administrations can influence the long-term growth. These 
theories provide a framework of analysis of growth and its determinants which can also be 
used to study the incidence of public policies on economic growth and investments in R&D.   
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3. R&D investment and market imperfection  
Economic theory and empirical proof show that technical progress, because of its 
incidence on the factors of production, constitutes key element in the long run determining 
economic growth; in certain countries, it represents even the most significant element. 
However, it is not a question of an economic justification of the official intervention for 
allocate the resources in favour of R&D. But, this intervention in a market economy is 
justified by incapacity of market to distribute resources in an efficient or acceptable way as 
regards social aspects. With regard to the investment in R&D, external effects and market 
imperfections testify the incapacity of market, and the effects are felt not only beyond 
particular companies but also beyond national borders.  
In a market economy, a company will not invest in a project if it knows that it can not 
adapt the possible receipts, however if it cannot adapt a portion of these receipts, it will invest 
if this portion is enough to make a profitable investment. Asymmetrical information and 
imperfect competition constitute two other kinds of imperfections of market involving under 
investment in R&D. For example, asymmetrical information prevents effective operation of 
capital market. Indeed, it can involve rationing of appropriations as well as abandonment of 
investments in R&D3 in projects with strong chances of success thanks to the plan of 
financing, and the continuation of investments in the project having weak chances of 
success4. 
III. Complementarity versus substitutability between private 
and public R&D 
          Theoretical work did not succeed in slicing on favourable or unfavourable effect using 
certain political instruments on the level of R&D in private sectors. The results of each model 
strongly depend on its structure and its assumptions. Empirical work, leads to homogeneous 
results and identifies a positive effect of public R&D on that private Hall. David. P (1998), 
Klette and Moen (1998), Scott (1984). With an aim of knowing the relation between public 
and private R&D we give an overall picture of the activities of R&D in world. Indeed, in this 
section, we attach more importance to activity of public and private R&D in the most 
significant poles in world. 
                                                 
3 Mcfetridge (1996) reviews the literature on various kinds of gaps of the market and their possible incidences 
on the investment in the R&D.  
4 Himmelberg and Peterson (94), show that in fact mainly internal sources are used for the financing of the R&D 
since asymmetrical information restricted the external financing.  
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          After the significant increase in the budget of R&D of the States Linked during the 
Fifties, Blanck and Stigler (1957) were among the first which raise the question about the 
existing relation between the public and private R&D. Thus, using a sufficiently broad 
sample of companies, the authors try to test the existence of a relation of complementarity or 
substitutability between private and public investment as regards R&D. Indeed, the 
implications of study are still significant until the policies of R&D today because a relation of 
complementarity is justified for the public funds whereas substitution is observed like a 
"misallocation".  
         Through time and with the improved scientific methods, it became clearly that the final 
situation towards the effect of the public funds of R&D cannot be made. Thus, in general, 
two fields can be identified and which are used to analyze the relation between private 
investment and public in research and development with knowing quantitative and qualitative 
studies: On the one hand; for the qualitative studies, data are frequently based on the 
investigations. On the other hand; for the quantitative studies, they are based on macro and 
micro-economic information of a significant number of companies.   
         In this last context, David. Toole et al. (1999)5 give highlights of economic surveys with 
an aim of analyzing the net impact of public research and development on private R&D. 
Thus, such illustrative example of statistics of the found results, and among 14 studies, only 
two indicates a substitution effect at the overall level. On the level of the companies, results 
are less clear, i.e. in 9 studies sur19, there is a substitution effect.  
         Today, several activities of R&D are carried out on the level of the services sector. On 
the one hand, this is due to the external sources of the strategies of manufacturing industries 
in the Eighties. On the other hand, the transformation of information and technology of 
communication get more opportunities for innovating sectors. So the governments help more 
and more activities of R&D in several sectors with an aim of stimulating technological 
performances of their countries. Thus, several examples can be quoted. At this level, for the 
Nineties and more precisely in 1999, the total expenditure of R&D of Germany is 47 billion 
dollars where 66% of this amount is invested by private industries, 18% by government and 
the remainder are invested by foreign companies.  
           Thus, an international comparison on behalf of public programs of R&D shows that 
Germany is one of principal countries which grant funds for the technological performance.  
                                                 
5 David Toole et al. (1999).  
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At this level, manufacturing industry plays a very significant role concerning R&D. From 
there, a question emerges up to what point evolution of public funds of R&D makes it 
possible to stimulate R&D carried out by private sector, and on which level results are 
checked?  
          Recently, an econometric micro study6 tackled the question of the impact of political 
instruments about activity of R&D deprived on the level of companies. This study aims at 
detailing the influences of several determinants which can have an impact on private R&D; 
Klette et al. (2000) tried to test the effect of this impact on several levels.  
         In the Nineties, with Busom (2000) and Wallsten (1999), other problems were posed: 
namely the endogenity and causality. In the same way, the form, which is described by 
Lichtenberg (1987), Klette and Moen (1998) are connected to the decisions of public funds. 
Busom (2000) applies dummies variables in its model suggested to measure the impact of 
government aid to R&D carried out by private sector. In its turn, Lach (2000) could test the 
impact of programs of R&D on the amount of investment in both cases, with or without 
public supports.  
         Several other studies are more precisely interested in testing the effects of public 
subsidies in R&D on the amount of deprived investment like that of Czanitzki and Fier 
(2001), Klette and Moen (1998) etc…The major goal of these studies is to know if public 
subsidies of research and development can have an effect of reduction or increase in the 
expenditure of R&D. The results suggest that public subsidies of R&D on the level of several 
industries showed that there is a small tendency to the effect of ousting “Crowding out”. In 
addition, it seems not to have any effect or degree of complementarity.   
 In the following section we empirically test fundamental relation which we seek to 
analyze in the case of (23) countries for the period 1992-2004, in other words we test the 
existence of a relation of complementarity and to check this result. 
IV. Empirical validation: Dynamic panel data 
There are several econometrics approaches, so we are going to follow a typical 
approach while holding account of some determinants of private research and development. 
The theoretical works that studied this question propose models founded on several political 
instruments. These works show that these policies can have a negative/ positive impact on the 
                                                 
6 That of Klette and Moen (2000).  
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expenses deprived in R&D. Nevertheless, very little study to these days, value the impact of 
these research efforts. As for the empiric works, they showed a positive effect of political 
instruments on private level of research and development. However, these works come up 
against several limits essentially bound to the used methods econometrics and to the choices 
of indicators that represent the variable private R&D.   
The objective of this work is to test the impact of an action of public policies 
empirically on the evolution of R&D in private sector while trying to surmount limits. The 
modelling that we follow to measure the effect of the R&D deprived on the public one; while 
taking into account some determinants of private R&D; is the one of Bettina and al (2002). 
This modelling has also been applied by: Busom (1999) and Lach (2000). The gait of these 
authors can be summarized like follows:   
Private R&D = ß * public R&D + control variables + e 
The underlying logic is simple:   
If the coefficient β* has a positive sign we can say that public R&D are 
complementary for private R&D. In other words, an increase of 1% of public research and 
development level entails a growth of β*% of private R&D. On contrary, if β* has a negative 
sign we can say that there is a relation of substitutability between public and private R&D. In 
this part we try, to give a general setting for the models to estimate while putting accent on 
some remarks and inconveniences of these models. We apply a dynamic panel data model. 
Finally, after having estimated the model we analyze results.    
In our survey we present in fact, a brief of empirical literature on the relation private 
and public R&D. We propose empirical tests on Panel of (23) countries between 1992 and 
2004. We specify for it a dynamic model, which we estimate by different methods, notably 
Generalized Moments Method (GMM).  
1. Dynamic panel data model: Definition and evaluations method   
Dynamic models are characterized by presence of one or several endogenous 
variables delayed among explanatory variables.  Our specified model is a dynamic panel 
model is given by:   
)1('
1 νµβα itiititit xyy +++= −               
Under another forms one writing our model as below:    
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)2(
43211 νµββββα itiitititititit IDEVAMGRR ++++++= −  
Where; 
           : Endogenous variable appears in the regression as being a retarded explanatory 
variable. In other words, present stocks of research and development of country (i) are 
explained by stocks of research of the period (t-1).    
yit 1−
 X: Represent the vector of exogenous variables; these variables are added value 
(VA), public research (G), import (M), foreign direct investment (IDE) and private research;    
(α, β): Designate parameters to estimate;   
            µi : Constitute individual heterogeneity as: µi   i.i.d. ~ N [(0, 1)];   
            And: vi,t is stochastic term as: vi,t~ i.i.d. [(0, 1)].   
yi,t is the logarithm of volume of R&D in country (i). xi,t is determinant vector of 
R&D. µi is the specific effect of country (i). This specific effect can be a stationary or 
uncertain effect.  
2. Methods of evaluation   
The evaluation of the model by traditional methods (Ordinary Least Square "OLS" 
and within) gives biased and non convergent values because of inter-relationship between 
retarded endogenous variable and individual heterogeneity. We try to demonstrate for the 
case of a simple model the inconveniences of these methods of evaluations. 
In summary, the bias is positive and increases with the variance of the specific effect.  
Indeed, yi,t is function of vi,t and yi,t-1 is also. yi,t-1 is an explanatory variable correlated with 
stochastic term. It introduces a bias in the value of ordinary least squares. Even as putting 
hypothesis that stochastic terms are not correlated, this value is non convergent.         
Our model should not be estimated by the method of OLS and LSDV due to the fact 
that estimating by these methods led to ad hoc results. Which are then adequate methods to 
estimate our model? We propose below two methods which consist in obtaining consistent 
estimators.  
2.1. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) Method 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) proposed, initially, to write the model from first 
difference to eliminate individual heterogeneity. They propose for the transformation two 
instruments.    
( ) ( ) )3(
1211 ννα −−−− −+−=− itititititit yyyy          
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The two values are convergent when N and T ∞→ . However, an inter-relationship 
always persists between endogenous variable in first difference and residual term. Authors 
proposed to resort to the method of instrumental variables to surmount this problem. Thus, 
they propose to use instrument endogenous variable with two lags or his first differences. 
These instruments are correlated with explanatory variable and are not with residual term.   
To get more efficient results, Arellano and Bond (1991) approach permits to get a value of 
generalized moments “GMM” more efficient.   
2. 2. Arellano and Bond (1991) approach   
 Arellano and Bond (1991) are the first in 1991 that proposed an extension of GMM 
introduced initially by Hansen (1982), to the case of panel data for a simple model AR (1):   
)6(
1 vyy itiitit ++= − µα        
                                                 Where     0≺γ  
We consider the case where temporal dimension is small while individual dimension 
(N) is important. We consider that individual effects are stationary and we assume traditional 
hypotheses of residues: 
In difference models (6) can be written as below: 
 
)7(0
1
≺γα uyy ititit += ∆∆ −         
Where uit = vit-vit-1. 
We test for every individual of the linear restrictions of type: 
 
( )[ ] TttjforE yyy jititit ,...3;,...,201 ===∆−∆ −−α         (8) 
 The gait of Arellano and Bond, in presence of the exogenous variables, consists in 
estimating the model in difference: 
)9()('
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Moment conditions and instruments matrix are given respectively by: 
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The preceding dynamic model (9) can be rewritten for each individual in the 
following form:  
)12(VWy iiiii ++= µτδ  
  
Where τ is a vector of parameter and Wi is a matrix that contains the retarded 
dependent variable and explanatory variables. The method proposed by these author’s 
permits to get a GMM in two stages is written in following form:   
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However, to have previous value GMM, it is necessary to pass by a first stage that 
consists in making wished transformation (first difference or orthogonal deviation), to find 
and to use instruments matrix and to achieve a first evaluation named "evaluation of first 
stage". This stage corresponds to an evaluation that permits to provide estimated residues 
after transformation. In the first stage, the values are gotten while using Hi as: 
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The objective of transformation is, as at Anderson and Hsiao (1982), to eliminate 
individual heterogeneity of the model. The number of instrument increases in the time for 
every individual. In the case where exist explanatory variables xit in the model correlated with 
heterogeneity individual µi . Optimal instruments matrix corresponding Zi is equal to:   
⎟⎟
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Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a test verifying the absence of autocorrelation of 
first and second order. Thus, if distribution is non auto-correlated, this test gives a value of 
residues differentiated negative and significant to first order and non significant to the second 
order. This test that is based on auto-covariance of residues follows a normal law N (0,1) 
under hypothesis H0. Otherwise, authors propose the test of validity of instruments of Sargan 
(1988). The statistical test Sis equal to:   
)16(ˆ'ˆ
**'
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
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⎞
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V. Empirical results 
1. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) Method    
By Anderson and Hsiao method our model in first difference becomes:    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )yyMMGGRRRR itititititititititit 13121111 −−−−− −+−+−+−=− βββα  
              
                             ( ) )17(
114 ννβ −− −+−+ itititit IDEIDE       
 
The evaluation of (17) when we use yi,t-2 and yi,t-2 - yi,t-3 as instrument gives results in 
tables 1 and 2 respectively  
Insert tables 1 and 2 
After we have estimate model by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) method and to get more 
efficient results, we try to apply the approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) that permits to get 
a generalized moment GMM more efficient. 
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2. Arellano and Bond (1991) in first difference  
The evaluation that we present in table 3 corresponds to the GMM evaluation of 
Arellano and Bond (1991).  The empirical evaluations confirm the positive effect of the R&D 
on growth of R&D of different country (positive and significant effect in all evaluations). 
However, identification of effects of other variables is far from being obvious according to 
different evaluations, a positive and significant effect in of Anderson and Hsiao evaluation of 
which public research are affected of a positive and significant value (0.034631350) with a 
(T-Stat = 2.11157) in the same way (1.91820030) with a (T-Stat = 1.90250), therefore these 
results verify the existence of a positive and significant relation between the two variables. 
For GMM method in first difference the variable spends public research is positive and 
significant (1.20891059), (T-Stat = 2.90728).  
Insert table 3 
3. Unit root test  
Levin and Lin (1992), consider the following model: 
yi,t = ρiyi,t–1 + Z′it γ + ui,t             (i=1, …, N; t=1, …, T)     (18) 
Where, Zi,t is the deterministic component and ui,t is a stationary process.   
µi  is the fixed effect, 
The Levin and Lin (LL) tests assume that ui,t are iid (0,σ2u) and ρi=ρ for all i.  The LL 
test is restrictive in the sense that it requires ρ to be homogeneous across i. Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (1997) (IPS) allow for a heterogeneous coefficient of yi,t-1 and propose an alternative 
testing procedure based on averaging individual unit root test statistics.  IPS suggested an 
average of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests when ui,t is serially correlated with 
different series. Correlation properties across cross-sectional units, i.e;  
itjitij
p
jti uu i εα +∑= −=1, . 
Substituting this ui,t in (1) we get: 
  (19) ititjitij
p
jititi zyyy i εγαρ +′+∆∑+= −=− 11,
The null and for all i the alternative hypothesis are: 
Ho: ρi = 1 
Ha: ρi < 1 
For  at least one i.  The IPS t-bar statistic is defined as the average of the individual 
ADF statistic as: 
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Where tρi is the individual t-statistic of testing Ho: ρi = 1 in (19).  It is known for a 
fixed N as T → ∞ 
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IPS assumes that tiT are iid are have finite mean variance.  Then 
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As N→ ∞ central limit theorem.  Hence 
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      (23) 
As T→ ∞ followed by N→ ∞ sequentially, the values of E[tiT/ρi=1] and Var[tiT/ρi=1] 
have been computed by IPS simulations for different values of T and ρ′is. As applying the 
test on our complete model our results is summarized in table 4 
Insert table 4 
The application of the tests of unit root LL and IPS shows that the whole of the 
statistical series is affected of a unit root. It should be noted that the number of maximum 
delay is fixed at 3; the selection of the numbers of delay for each individual is programmed 
by Pedroni for these two tests.   
VI. Conclusion    
          In our survey, we tried to put accent on private and public investment in R&D, for the 
case of (23) country which presents different levels of R&D. We tried to clarify relation that 
exists between private and public research. This empirical survey wanted to give account, the 
effects of different determinants on private investment in R&D and to know if public and 
private investments in R&D are complement or substitute. 
          Econometric approach consists in the regression of some measures of private R&D on 
public R&D with some control variables. The evaluation that we presented in our work 
corresponds to GMM evaluation of Arellano and Bond (1991). We prefer to refer to results of 
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this evaluation because it permits to eliminate rigorous way all bias to none observed 
individual heterogeneity and offer, a better efficiency of results. Empiric evaluations confirm 
a positive effect of public R&D in different country (positive and meaningful effect in all 
evaluations). Results of our empiric survey are relative for our sample and they go in the 
sense of results of ulterior studies, which showed that there is a positive and meaningful 
relation between private and public investment in R&D.    
Some studies put in value of other factors that can be important as: competition in the 
market, public politics and cooperation concerning R&D between firms.  Cooperation in 
R&D is a part of the new strategies developed by firms in more global and competitive 
economic environment. These last factors are not to disregard and can be subject of a future 
research concerning the relation between public and private investment in R&D.   
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Appendix 
Table 1:  Anderson and Hsiao method 
 Coeff T-Stat Signif 
R (-2) 1.043741733 2.61851 0.01862671 
G 0.034631350 2.11157 0.01255140 
M 0.117410800 3.10834 0.00507352 
VA 0.261604184 1.09045 0.02905193 
IDE 0.068683520 2.10772 0.01555534 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Anderson and Hsiao method 
  Coeff T-Stat Signif 
R (-2)-R (-3) 4.02020750 2.11480 0.0226709 
G 1.91820030 1.90250 0.03925921 
M 1.86404603 2.34064 0.01364196 
VA 1.25706985 2.84950 0.02590034 
IDE 0.55898626 3.09396 0.02520837 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16
Table 3:  Arellano and Bond method in first difference 
 Coeff T-Stat Signif 
R(-1) 0.52001865 0.46582 0.64180074 
G 1.20891059 2.90728 0.03425802 
M 1.36345220 2.36785 0.01333684 
VA 1.15210478 1.29346 0.36944694 
IDE 1.14085022 2.15794 0.02465192 
                                                                                              Sargan test: Ch^2 (20) =25.78 (0.001)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Unit root Tests  
 
Statistics R G M VA IDE 
Levin-Lin  ADF stat 3.83805 -1.40533 -0.10589 -1.52279 -1.27014 
IPS ADF stat 2.61779 -0 28466 -1.08827 -0.17841 -0.19014 
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